Abstract. We explore the minimal assumptions that are necessary for nontrivial argument systems, such as Kilian's argument system for NP with polylogarithmic communication complexity [K92]. We exhibit an oracle relative to which there is a 2-round argument system with poly-logarithmic communication complexity for some language in NP, but no one-way functions. The language lies outside BPTime(2 o(n) ), so the relaxation to computational soundness is essential for achieving sublinear communication complexity. We obtain as a corollary that under black-box reductions, non-trivial argument systems do not imply one-way functions.
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Main Results
In this work, we establish a connection between the two problems: we provide a relativized construction of Pessiland which contains a non-trivial 2-round argument system for a language in NP.
Theorem 1.
There exists an oracle relative to which there exists a strongly hard-onaverage language in NP ∩ coNP, but no one-way functions. Furthermore, there is a 2-round public-coin argument system with poly-logarithmic communication complexity for a language that lies within NP but outside BPTime(2 o(n) ).
It is important that our argument system is for a language outside BPTime(2 o(n) ), as it means that the relaxation to computational soundness is essential for achieving sublinear communication complexity. This rules out trivial 2-round argument systems with poly-logarithmic communication complexity for languages in BPP or NTime(log 2 n). In particular, a relativizing argument in [GH98] implies that languages outside BPTime(2 o(n) ) do not have interactive proof systems with sublinear (total) communication complexity, regardless of the number of rounds, and even if the verifier is allowed a polynomial amount of private randomness.
As a corollary, we deduce that there does not exist a black-box construction (such as those used in [V04, W05] ) of one-way functions or collision-resistant hash functions from non-trivial 2-round argument systems. This partially explains why we have not been able to prove a statement of the form "if there exists a non-trivial 2-round argument system, then there exists one-way functions". In particular, a proof of this statement must use a non-relativizing argument or make some stronger assumptions on the underlying language. On the other hand, we do not expect to disprove this statement. Suppose non-trivial 2-round argument systems do not exist (which is quite plausible); then, the statement is vacuously true.
The black-box construction of primitives from interactive protocols in [V04, W05] only yields auxiliary-input primitives, as the input instance for the protocol is hardwired into the algorithm computing the primitive. As such, one would ideally like to rule out auxiliary-input one-way functions (that is, we only require that the function be computable by a nonuniform polynomial-time algorithm) while exhibiting a non-trivial argument system. At this point, we are only able to achieve a much weaker result:
Theorem 2. There exists an oracle relative to which there exists a strongly hard-onaverage language in NP, but no auxiliary-input one-way functions.
The analysis of our first construction is fairly straight-forward apart from some subtle details, and uses several techniques from previous work (such as [IR89, GT00] ); the insight lies in the construction and in establishing a connection between Pessiland and non-trivial argument systems. Our second construction, on the other hand, requires a more intricate and novel analysis.
Perspective and Related Works
Round-efficient argument systems. All previous constructions of non-trivial argument systems (in the standard model) [K92, BG02] require 4 rounds and the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. Micali [M00] gave the first relativized construction of a non-trivial 2-round argument system, by using a random oracle to instantiate collisionresistant hash functions and the Fiat-Shamir paradigm in Kilian's 4-round protocol [K92] . While these previous constructions were for either NP-complete or NEXPcomplete languages, our relativized construction (which does not require one-way functions or collision-resistant hash functions) is for a language in NP but possibly not NP-complete. We stress that previous work [W05] deducing hard-on-average problems in NP from non-trivial argument systems for NP (and NEXP) does not exploit the structure of NP in any way; it merely uses the fact NP does not have a proof system with the same communication complexity as the underlying argument system under standard complexity assumptions.
Relationships between cryptographic primitives. Starting with the work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] , the study of relationships between cryptographic primitives has focused on the impossibility of basing complex primitives on simpler ones, particularly one-way functions and one-way permutations. Our main result goes in the reverse direction: it shows the impossibility of constructing simpler primitives from a specific cryptographic application (in a black-box manner). It also provides an example of a cryptographic application (for a contrived language, unfortunately) which may be based on weaker assumptions than the existence of one-way functions. In an unpublished work, Impagliazzo and Rudich gave the first 1 relativized construction of Pessiland, which yields a black-box separation between hard-on-average languages in NP and one-way functions.
Preliminaries
We use Π to denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1} , F n, to denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} , and U n to denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . A negligible function is a function of the form n −ω(1) . In the context of describing probability distributions, we write x ∼ U n to denote choosing x according to the distribution U n ; we also use x ∈ S to denote choosing an element x from the set S uniformly at random. We use · to denote the standard dot product of binary strings, and H(·) to denote the Shannon entropy function, namely,
Models of Computation
A circuit has AND and OR gates where each gate has in-degree 2 and out-degree 1, and is labeled with a bit that indicates whether its value should be negated. The size of a circuit is the number of gates. A nonuniform polynomial-time algorithm refers to a family of polynomial-size circuits; specifically, we may consider the polynomial-time algorithm as being circuit evaluation and the nonuniformity being the corresponding circuit. An oracle circuit has 3 types of gates: AND, OR and oracle gates. The in/outdegree of the oracle gate matches the input/output length of the oracle. It is easy to see that an oracle circuit of size s having input/output length n and oracle access to a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} can be encoded using O(sn log(sn)) bits. A nonuniform oracle polynomial-time algorithm refers to a family of polynomial-size oracle circuits. 
Average-Case
A function f is weakly one-way (resp. strongly one-way) if f is α-one-way for some α(n) = n −c where c > 0 is a constant (resp. some α(n) = 1 − n −ω(1) ).
All of these notions extend naturally to the setting of oracle nonuniform polynomialtime algorithms (and oracle circuits). We will often appeal to the following technical lemma from [GT00] stating that random permutations are strongly one-way. We will also use the fact that the proof relativizes.
Lemma 1 ([GT00]).
For all sufficiently large , with probability 1−2 −2 /2 over π ∈ Π , for all oracle circuits A of size 2 /5 ,
Interactive Proofs and Argument Systems
For a relation R ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , the language associated with R is L R = {x : ∈ L, then for every P * , V accepts in (P * ,V )(x) with probability at most s(|x|).
We call c(·) the completeness error and s(·) the soundness error. We say that (P,V ) has negligible error if both c and s are negligible. We say that it has perfect completeness if c = 0. P is an efficient prover if P(w) is computable by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when (x, w) ∈ R. The communication complexity of the proof system is the total length of all the messages exchanged by both parties, and the round complexity is the total number of messages exchanged by both parties (in both directions).
Definition 5. An argument system (P,V ) is defined in the same way as an interactive proof system, with the following modification:
-The soundness condition is replaced with computational soundness: For every nonuniform polynomial-time machine P * and for all sufficiently long x / ∈ L, the verifier V accepts in (P * ,V )(x) with probability at most s(|x|).
In this paper, we focus on public-coin argument systems with perfect completeness, negligible soundness error, and an efficient prover.
Relativization and Black-Box Reductions
In each of our relativized constructions, we consider a family of oracles O = {O n } n≥1 , with an oracle for each input length. For simplicity, we will only present our results for the model where an oracle Turing machine (respectively an oracle circuit) on an input of length m only queries O n for a single value of n, where n = n(m) is polynomially related to m. This is already sufficient to capture most black-box reductions and transformations used in cryptography.
For black-box constructions of cryptographic primitives from interactive protocols, we require that the construction uses oracle access to the efficiently computable entities in the protocol, such as the verifier, the efficient prover (if one exists), and the simulator (in the case of zero-knowledge). An example is the construction of one-way functions from zero-knowledge proof systems in [V04] , where the function is computed using black-box access to the simulator and the verifier for the underlying proof system. Such constructions usually only yield auxiliary-input cryptographic primitives because we need to hardwire the instance used in the protocol into the algorithm for computing the primitive. We omit a formal definition of black-box constructions used in this work (as a sufficiently general framework will be fairly involved without yielding any additional insight); instead, we refer the reader to [RTV04] for a formal treatment of black-box constructions and reductions.
The Impagliazzo-Rudich Construction
We begin by reviewing the relativized construction of Pessiland due to Impagliazzo and Rudich (unpublished). We use some of the ideas and proofs in our main constructions.
Theorem 3 (Impagliazzo-Rudich). There exists an oracle relative to which there exists a strongly hard-on-average language in NP ∩ coNP, but no one-way functions.
For any f ∈ F n,n (namely, a function from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n ), we define a verification oracle for f :
The construction used in the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows:
Construction 1. For each n ∈ N, we have an oracle V π , for some permutation π ∈ Π n (specifically, one that satisfies the condition in Lemma 1 and that in Lemma 2 below). In addition, we provide access to a PSPACE oracle.
We choose π by sampling a random permutation on {0, 1} n . If π is strongly one-way, then the NP-relation {(x, w) | π(w) = x} yields a hard-on-average search problem (with a unique witness), and upon applying the Goldreich-Levin transformation [GL89] , we obtain a strongly hard-on-average language in NP ∩ coNP. Furthermore, a polynomialtime oracle Turing machine M makes a query to V π of the form (x, π(x)) with negligible probability, so M Z agrees with M V π on almost all inputs. Here, Z : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} denotes the function that evaluates to 0 everywhere. Using the PSPACE oracle, we may then invert M Z everywhere and thus M V π almost everywhere.
Lemma 2. Fix T (n) = n log n and an encoding of oracle Turing machines. For all sufficiently large n, with probability at least 1/2n 2 over π ∈ Π n , for all oracle Turing machines M that can be described using at most log n bits and makes at most T (n) oracle queries,
Proof. Fix an oracle Turing machine M. By linearity of expectations, we have
This allows us to take a union bound over all oracle Turing machines M with description at most log n bits (there are at most 2n of them).
Remark 1. As stated, the above lemma only allows us to rule out one-way functions computed by oracle Turing machines M that on an input of length n, only queries V π corresponding to a permutation on {0, 1} n . To handle the case where M queries oracles corresponding to permutations on different input lengths, we choose π ∈ Π n to allow for a union bound over all oracle Turing machines M that can be described using at most log n bits and makes at most T (n) queries to V π on some input of length m(n) where m(n) is polynomially related to n (instead of only considering m(n) = n).
Lemma 3 ([LTW05]
). Let f , g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be functions that agree on an ε fraction of inputs. Let A() be the probabilistic procedure that, for every y ∈ {0, 1} n , A(y) outputs ⊥ if f (−1) (y) = / 0, and a uniformly random element of f (−1) (y) otherwise. Then, the probability that A (g(x) ) ∈ g (−1) (g(x)) is at least ε 2 , when taken over the uniform choice of x ∈ {0, 1} n and over the internal coin tosses of A.
Remark 2. Since we also provide access to a PSPACE oracle, we should say that with overwhelming probability over π, M Z,PSPACE agrees with M V π ,PSPACE almost everywhere. This is true since the proof of Lemma 2 relativizes. With a PSPACE oracle, we may uniformly sample pre-images for M Z,PSPACE in probabilistic polynomial time, which together with Lemma 3, is sufficient to rule out one-way functions. GL89] ). For all sufficiently large n, with probability 1 − o(1/n 2 ) over π ∈ Π n , the function f : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} given by f (y, r) = π −1 (y) · r is (1/2 − n − log n )-hard against oracle circuits of size n log n with oracle access to π.
Lemma 4 ([GT00,

Our First Pessiland
We present our construction that establishes Theorem 1. Fix n and = 100 log 2 n. For each f ∈ F n,3n and a collection of permutations {π y ∈ Π | y ∈ {0, 1} 3n }, we define a 3-tuple (V π ,V f , T ) where V π and V f are verification oracles for checking the relations induced by {π y } and f , and T is a trapdoor permutation oracle for computing π y and π −1 y if given (w, y) such that f (w) = y. Our 2-round protocol for the language L f = {y | ∃w : f (w) = y} is shown in Fig 1. On input y ∈ {0, 1} 3n , the prover is asked to invert π y on a random input, and the verifier checks the answer using the verification oracle V π . The trapdoor permutation oracle yields an efficient prover for the YES instances. For the NO instances, generating an accepting response is as hard as inverting a random permutation.
Common input: An instance y ∈ {0, 1} 3n . Prover's private input: A witness w ∈ {0, 1} n .
P → V : Send α = T (w, y, β ). Verification: V accepts if V π (y, α, β ) = 1 (that is, π y (α) = β ). Fig. 1 . 2-round public-coin protocol prot for the language L f = {y | ∃w : f (w) = y} Construction 2. For each n ∈ N, we have an oracle (V π ,V f , T ), for some appropriate choices of f ∈ F n,3n and {π y ∈ Π O(log 2 n) | y ∈ {0, 1} 3n }. In addition, we provide access to a PSPACE oracle.
We begin with an overview of the analysis for our construction.
Computational soundness. A successful cheating prover is one that inverts π y on a noticeable fraction of inputs, for some y / ∈ L f . However, for each y / ∈ L f , the random permutation π y is one-way against oracle circuits of size n log n with probability 1 − 2 −n log n (Lemma 1). This holds even if the circuit is given oracle access to V f , π y and (π y , π −1 y ) for all y = y (which are sufficient to simulate the oracles (V π ,V f , T )), because π y and f are chosen independently of π y . We can then take a union bound to ensure that every permutation in the collection {π y } is strongly one-way, as shown in Lemma 5.
Ruling out low-communication proof systems. A 2-round argument system for L f
with communication complexity (n) is only interesting if we could rule out 2-round interactive proof systems for the language L f with the same communication complexity. We prove in Lemma 6 that there is no subexponential-size oracle circuits for deciding L f , given oracle access to V f and to {(π y , π −1 y )} y∈{0,1} 3n , which is sufficient to simulate oracle access to (V π ,V f , T ). This implies L f / ∈ BPTime(2 o(n) ). Note that an algorithm running in time BPTime(2 O( (n)) ) can compute and invert the permutations π y everywhere given oracle access to V π . It is therefore essential to our proof that the collection of permutations {π y } is defined independently of f .
Ruling out one-way functions. The analysis is virtually identical to that for the
Impagliazzo-Rudich Pessiland, since a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine is unlikely to query (V π ,V f , T ) at any input where the answer is neither 0 nor ⊥. Note that in order to satisfy the efficient prover condition (for YES instances), it suffices to provide oracle access to π
in T . By incorporating oracle access to π f (w) into T , we also rule out the trivial auxiliary-input one-way permutation given by π
−1 f (w)
. However, we do not know how to rule out every auxiliary-input one-way function for this construction.
A strongly hard-on-average language. We can construct the language from the strongly hard-on-average function given by g : {0, 1} 3n+2 → {0, 1} where g(y, β , r)
Lemma 5. For all sufficiently large n, for every f ∈ F n,3n , with probability 1 − 2 −Ω (n log n ) over {π y } y∈{0,1} 3n ∈ Π 2 3n , for all y ∈ {0, 1} 3n and for all oracle circuits A of size n log n ,
Proof. By Lemma 1 (and the fact that it relativizes), if we fix a sufficiently large n, along with any f ∈ F n,3n , any y ∈ {0, 1} 3n , and any π y ∈ Π for all y = y, we know that with probability 2 −Ω (n log n ) over π y ∈ Π , for all oracle circuits A of size n log n ,
The lemma follows from taking a union bound over all y ∈ {0, 1} 3n .
Lemma 6. For all sufficiently large n, for every collection of permutations{π y } y∈{0,1} 3n , with probability 1 − 2 −Ω (2 n ) over f ∈ F n,3n , there is no oracle circuit of size 2 n/5 that given oracle access to V f and to
Proof. We establish this result following the counting argument in [GT00] . We may neglect oracle access to {(π y , π −1 y )} y∈{0,1} 3n since the argument relativizes. The idea is to show that any function f for which there is an oracle circuit A that given oracle access to V f decides L f has a "short" description (given A). There are very few such functions, so a random f satisfies the hardness property with overwhelming probability.
Formally, fix an oracle circuit A : {0, 1} 3n → {0, 1} of size 2 n/5 and suppose A on oracle access to V f decides L f for some f ∈ F n,3n . We simulate A on every input in {0, 1} 3n in lexicographic order and observe the queries that A makes to V f . WLOG, assume A never makes the same query twice on a given input. Define X ⊆ {0, 1} n to be all x such that A queries V f on (x, f (x)).
CASE 1: |X| ≤ 3 4 · 2 n . Given the set X and f | X , we may simulate A on all inputs without oracle access to V f , thereby recovering the set f ({0, 1} n ). We may then specify f on each input outside X using just n bits (instead of 3n bits) since we only need n bits to specify an element in the set f ({0, 1} n ).
CASE 2: |X| > 3 4 · 2 n . Over all possible inputs, A makes at most 2 3n · 2 n/5 queries to V f . Therefore, there are at most 1 4 · 2 n values of x for which A makes more than 4 · 2 2n · 2 n/5 queries to V f of the form (x, ·). In particular, there is a subset X of X with 1 2 · 2 n elements, and for each x ∈ X , A makes at most 4 · 2 2n · 2 n/5 queries to V f of the form (x, ·). Given the circuit A, the set X and f | {0,1} n \X , we may specify f on each input in X using 11n/5 + 2 bits (instead of 3n bits) since we only need to specify i such that the i'th query A makes of the form (x, ·) returns 1.
In both cases, given A, we may specify f with 2 n (2n/5 − 2) less bits (relative to the 2 n · 3n bits required to specify a function in F n,3n ). It takes an additional O(2 n/5 n 2 ) bits to specify A.
A Second Pessiland
We present our next construction that establishes Theorem 2. It is similar to the Impagliazzo-Rudich Pessiland except we provide a verification oracle for a random function instead of a random permutation.
Construction 3. For each n ∈ N, we have an oracle V f , for some appropriate choice of f ∈ F n,n . In addition, we provide access to a PSPACE oracle.
First, we show that for most f ∈ F n,n , the language L f = {y | ∃x : f (x) = y} is weakly hard-on-average (Lemma 7); the proof is an extension of that for Lemma 6, except more involved because we are establishing average-case hardness instead of worst-case hardness. Since the main technical result from [HVV04] on hardness amplification within NP relativizes, we may deduce that there is a strongly hard-onaverage language L f in NP/poly, obtained by applying some monotone transformation to some padded variant of L f . We provide an additional oracle that on input 1 n , outputs the nonuniformity needed to compute L f in NP. To rule out auxiliary-input one-way functions, it suffices to show that the function computed by any small oracle circuit may be approximated by the function computed by a standard circuit with a polynomial blow-up in size (Lemma 8).
Lemma 7. For all sufficiently large n, with probability 1 − 2 −Ω (n 2 ) over f ∈ F n,n , the language L f = {y | ∃x : f (x) = y} is 0.01-hard against oracle circuits of size 2 o(n) with oracle access to V f .
Proof (sketch).
A standard "balls in bins" analysis (e.g. [MR95, Theorem 4.18]) tells us that with probability 1 − 2 −Ω (2 n ) over f ∈ F n,n , | f ({0, 1} n )| is bounded from above by 2 3 · 2 n (we may replace 2 3 by any constant larger than 1 − 1 e ). We may then simply focus on f such that | f ({0, 1} n )| < 2 3 · 2 n , and proceed as in the proof of Lemma 6. Again, we consider an oracle circuit A : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} that solves L f on at least a 0.99 fraction of inputs and we define X to be all x such that A queries V f on (x, f (x)).
is, the subset of inputs on which A is wrong. Given f | X and the sets X,Y (which may be specified using (0.02n + H(0.02) + H(0.01) + o(1))2 n bits), we may simulate A on all inputs without oracle access to V f , thereby recovering the set f ({0, 1} n ). We may then specific f on inputs outside X using log( 2 3 · 2 n ) bits. Therefore, given the circuit A, we may specify f using 2 n n − (0.98 log CASE 2: |X| > 0.02 · 2 n . We argue that there is a subset X of X with 0.01 · 2 n elements, and for each x ∈ X , A makes at most 100·2 o(n) queries to V f of the form (x, ·). Given the circuit A, we may then specify f using (0.99 + o(1))2 n n bits.
To facilitate the proof of the next lemma, we introduction an additional notation: for any f ∈ F n,n and any subset Q of {0, 1} n , we define:
Lemma 8. For all sufficiently large n, with probability 1 − 2 −Ω (n 2 ) over f ∈ F n,n , for all oracle circuits C of size s where n ≤ s ≤ 2 n/10 and for all ε ≥ 2 −n/10 , there exists a circuit C of size O(s 4 n 3 /ε 2 ) such that C V f and C agree on a 1 − ε/2 fraction of inputs.
To see why the naive approach of setting C = C Z (as in Lemma 2) fails, consider an oracle circuit C that independent of its input, outputs V f (0 n , 1 n ). Then, with probability 1 − 2 −n , C and C agree on all inputs, and with probability 2 −n , disagree on all inputs. This is not sufficient for a union bound over all polynomial-size circuits. To work around this, we hardwire into C information about f . Specifically, we show that with overwhelming probability over f ∈ F n,n , for all C of size s, there exists a set Q ⊆ {0, 1} n of size O(s 4 n 2 /ε 2 ) such that the circuit C V f ,Q agrees with C V f on a 1 − ε/2 fraction of inputs. Note that we allow Q to depend on f . We may specify f | Q using |Q|n bits of nonuniformity, so C V f ,Q may be computed by a circuit C of size O(s 4 n 3 /ε 2 ) (without oracle access to V f ).
Here is an outline of the analysis. Let us examine the first oracle query made by the circuit C on different inputs, and we define Q 1 to be all x such that the first query C makes to V f matches (x, ·) on more than a ε 3 /s 3 n 2 fraction of inputs. Therefore, |Q 1 | = poly(s, n, 1/ε). Now, consider the oracle circuit C 1 that behaves like C, except the first oracle query is made to V f ,Q 1 instead of V f . Suppose C and C 1 differs on a ε/2s fraction of inputs. This must be because for a ε/2s fraction of inputs, the first query C makes to V f matches (x, f (x)), for some x / ∈ Q 1 . For a random f and a fixed x, this happens with probability 2 −n . Moreover, this must happen for at least s 2 n 2 /ε 2 different values of x not in Q 1 (since each x / ∈ Q 1 accounts for at most a ε 3 /s 3 n 2 fraction of inputs). For a random f , the evaluation of f on each of these x values are independent. Thus, the probability (over f ) that C and C 1 differs on a ε/2s fraction of inputs is roughly 2 −Ω (ns 2 ) .
Proof. Formally, fix f ∈ F n,n . We define oracle circuits C 0 ,C 1 ,...,C s and subsets Q 0 , Q 1 ,...,Q s of {0, 1} n inductively as follows:
n Pr z i'th oracle query for computing C
-C i on input z and oracle access to V f simulates the computation of C V f (z) except for j = 1, 2,...,i, the j'th oracle query is answered using V f ,Q j instead of V f . We will hardwire the description of the sets Q 1 ,...,Q i into C i , so upon oracle access to V f , C i may simulate the oracles V f ,Q j , j = 1,...,i. This implies that with overwhelming probability over f , C V f and C V f ,Qs agree on a 1−ε/2 fraction of inputs. We may bound |Q s | by s 4 n 2 /ε 2 since |Q i | ≤ |Q i−1 |+s 3 n 2 /ε 2 . Hence, C V f ,Qs may be computed by a circuit C of size O(s 4 n 2 /ε 2 ). The lemma then follows from taking a union bound over all circuits of size s, all s between n and 2 n/10 , and all 1/ε between 2 and 2 n/10 . Now, we provide the proof of the above claim. (note that α x is independent of f ) and Y x to be the random variable (where the randomness is over f ∈ F n,n ) for the probability In the general case, we fix an assignment to f | Q i−1 , so the set Q i is also fixed. As before, we define This completes the proof of the technical claim.
Proof (of claim
)
